The Behavior of Home Buyers in Boom and Post-Boom Markets by Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE BEHAVIOR OF HOME BUYERS IN BOOM ANDPOSTBOOM MARKETS
Karl E. Case
Robert J. Shiller
Working Paper No. 2748




The authors are indebted to the survey respondants who tookvaluable time to
complete the questionnaire. We also want to thank AliciaMunnell, Kenneth
Rosen, Jeremy Siegel and participants at the Sage FoundationConference on
Behavioral Finance as well as seminar participants at Harvard andthe
University of Pennsylvania for helpful discussions. We arealso grateful to
Anne Kinsella at the Boston Federal Reserve Bank and LarryBaldwin at
Wellesley for masterful programming to help get the survey outand the
returns coded. Paula Andres, Jie Gao and Janet Hanousekworked very hard as
research assistants. The research reported here is part of the NBER's
program on Financial Markets and Monetary Economics. Fundingwas provided by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the National Science Foundation, and
Wellesley College. Any opinions expressed here are those of theauthors and
not of the National Bureau of Economic Research or the supporting agencies.NBER Working Paper #2748
October 1988
THE BEHAVIOR OF HOME BUYERS IN BOOM ANDPOSTBOOM MARKETS
ABSTRI
A questionnaire survey looked at home buyers in May 1988in
two "boom" cities currently experiencing rapid price increases
(Anaheim and San Francisco), a "post—boom" city whose home prices
are stable or falling a couple years after rapid priceincrease
(Boston) and a "control" city where home prices had been very
stable (Milwaukee).
Home buyers in the boom cities had much higher expectations
for future price increases, and were more influenced by
investment motives.The interpretations that people place on
the boom are not usually related to any concrete news event;
there are instead oft-repeated cliches about home prices. This
suggests that sudden real estate booms have, at leastin part, a
social, rather than rational or economic, basis.
There is evidence for excess demand in boom markets and
excess supply in the post-boom market; there appear to bevarious
reasons for this: notions of fairness, intrinsic worth, popular
theories about prices, coordination problems, and simple
mistakes.
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A recent development In the United States market for single—familyhomes
has provided an ideal laboratory in which to study the sourcesof volatility
in home prices: prices have been moving In dramatically different waysat the
same time in different parts of the country.A boom in housing prices has
appeared in California, with price increases fromlate 1987 to mid—1988
exceeding 20 percent in many cities. At the very same time, apost—boom
market exists in the Northeast. A remarkable boom occurredbetween 1983 and
mid—1987 in many places from New York to Boston, where housing pricesmore
than doubled in those three and one—half years. That boom appearsto be over,
with prices actually falling in late 1987. At the same time,it Is possible
to observe a housing market in the Midwest that has had no signof a boom for
the past five years.
We exploited this opportunity by collecting data aboutthe behavior of
home buyers in these different markets using questionnaire surveymethods.
Identical questionnaires were sent to those who bought homesin May of 1988 in
each of four markets: Anaheim (Orange County) and San Francisco,California
(two "boom" markets); Boston, Massachusetts (a "post—boom"market); and
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (a t;contro1I sample, representing morenormal housing
market conditions). Since the questionnaires wereidentical and were sent out
at the same time, differences in answers across cities canbe attributed only
to differences In the local market for housing and not todifferences in the
wording or order of questions or to national economicconditions.
He sought information that would help answer some nagging questionsabout
the nature and causes of booms in housing markets. Mostfundamentally, what—2-.
causes sudden and often dramatic and sustained price movements? Although
questionnaire survey methods can never provide a definitive answer to such a
question, they can provide information that helps us begin to understand the
process: What are home buyers thinking about, and what sources ofinformation
are used to decide how much to pay for a house? How motivated are they by
investment considerations, and how do they assess investment potential? Is
destabilizing speculation affecting housing prices?
Second, why does a state of excess demand tend to occur in boom markets,
where some people reportedly stand In line to make offers on the day that a
house Is listed for sale, often making bids that are above the asking price?
Why don't sellers just increase their asking prices until the excess demand
disappears?
Third, why does a state of excess supply seem to occur in post—boom
markets, where people reportedly take substantial periods of time to sell
their homes? Why don't people just cut their asking prices to eliminate the
excess supply?
Housing price booms have raised a number of concerns. A boom In housing
prices represents a major redistribution of wealth. Those who own seetheir
equity increase while those who do not face higher rents and reduced
probability of owning. This redistribution seems capricious and unfair to
many. Some have also expressed concern that high housing priceshave made it
more difficult for firms to attract labor to the boom regions. A special
report In the Harvard Business Review spoke of a "convulsion In U.S. housing"
that has begun to affect American business.1 The report cites examples of
firms In Boston and New York that have experienced severe problems
recruiting. Many have chosen to relocate outside the region as aresult.
Others are concerned that If speculators are pushing housing prices up
temporarily, then housing prices may fall rapidly, creating turmoil among—3—
homeowners and homebuilders and in the banking system. On August 22, 1988,
the front page of Barron's contained a full—page sketch of a home fallingoff
a cliff with the headline "The Coming Collapse ofHome Prices." A few cities
in recent years have In fact witnessed falling home prices. The bestknown
example Is Houston, where the median price of existing single—familyhomes
dropped 24 percent in two years, contributing to the Insolvencyof large
savings and loan institutions and multi—billion—dollar payouts bythe Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
Given the seriousness of the problems associated with rising and falling
housing prices, surprisingly little research has been done onthe questions we
pose here. Most models of housing pricemovements have focused on
macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, Income, and national
demographic trends. But the simple fact that the most dramatic examplesof
price booms have taken place in well—defined geographic areaswhile prices
were not rising in most of the country suggests that macrovariables offer
only a partial explanation.
The causes of these booms are still not understood. A study by oneof us
suggests that housing booms cannot be attributed torational fundamental
factors. In a 1986 article in this Review, Case sought to explainthe Boston
experience using data on economic fundamentals. His modelincluded such
demand—side and supply—side variables as population growth, employment growth,
Interest rates (short—term and long—term), construction costs,Income growth,
tax rates, and the like. Estimated with data from 10 citIes over a 10—year
period, that model failed to explain more than a fractionof the observed
Increase in Boston housing prices. Case then put forward a conjecturethat
the boom was essentially driven by expectations.
Part I of this paper describes the behavior of prices in thefour
metropolitan areas surveyed. Part II describes the survey,Including samples—4—
and response rates for each city. Part III summarizes the results of the
survey, and part IV presents some interpretations and conjectures.
I. Housing Prices in Four Metropolitan Areas
The survey described in Section II was sent to people who bought homes or
condominiums during the month of May 1988. By selecting buyers from a narrow
time window, we sought to control for national macroeconomic factors such as
interest rates and national income growth. Four metropolitan areas were
targeted for the survey. The four were chosen because of what we perceived to
be dramatic differences in recent price behavior.
Table 1 presents National Association of Realtors data on the median price
of existing single—family homes in each metropolitan area quarterly since 1983
and table 2 shows annual price increases. Chart 1 plots indexes derived from
table 1 for the same time period. Although we have shown in earlier work
(Case and Shiller 1987) that these are less than perfect measures of
appreciation, they are the only source consistent enough to allow such a
cross—cl ty comparison.
Orange County and San Francisco
The experience of these two very different California metropolitan areas
has been similar. Both experienced a period of rapid Increases In home prices
during the late 1970s. That came to an end in 1981. Beginning in late 1984,
prices began rising again In San Francisco; Orange County picked up in late
1986. WhIle prices In Boston were cooling in 1987 and 1988, San Francisco and
Orange County began booming. Table 3 and chart 2 show the pattern in Orange
County, and table 3 gives annual figures for several other areas in California
as well.TABLE I




Association of Realtors, Home Sales,
COUNTY BOSTON FRANCISCO
1983 82.60 129.50 134.90
133.50
68.00
69.80 1984:1 89.40 126.60
135.10 68.10 2 95.60 130.50
134.90 69.60 3 102.00 132.60
130.60 64.10 4 104.80 130.40
132.10 66.60 1885:1108.60 134.50
135.40 66.70 2 131.00 141.10
137.80 66.70 3 138.80 143.80
139.60 68.10 4 144.80 .
138.00 67.60 1986:1145.60 .
149.40 71.00 2 156.20 .
149.60 70.80 3 163.00 164.90
152.40 69.20 4 167.80 164.80
156.10 67.80 1987:1170.00 161.30





183.80 72.60 1988:1176.90 178.80
71.50TABLE 2
ANNUALINCREASESIN MEDIAN SINGLE FAMILY HOME PRICES
1983 —1988*
(percent)
1983—841984—85 1985—86 1986—87 1987—88
Boston 15.7 37.0 19.2 12.8 3.8
San Francisco 0.8 8.1 8.5** l1.0** 15.5
Orange County 0.1 0.2 10.3 12.0 21.9
Milwaukee 0.0 —2.2 6.6 1.0 —0.3
*Source: National Association of Realtors. Calculations done
from Table 1. All changes are from second quarter to second
quarter except the change for 1983-84 which is the change
from the 1983 annual figure to the 1984 second quarter
figure.
**Figures for San Francisco were not available for the second





























































































































































































































MEDIAN SALE PRICE JUNE SALES ACTIVITY
%haaq.%ta.q.
Fm.May FnYrAe R.qioa Ja.19UJ1987 SI.cs.us
Orange County$211,038 $170,163 24.0+25.2+18.6
Los Angeles$182,364 $148,670 22.7 4-6.4 +5.8
San Francisco$209,687 $173,098 21.1 +9.4 -2.6
San Diego $147,605 $125,488 17.6+14.3+15.1





Ventura $195,209 $160,303 21.8 +2.6-13.3
California $167,428$140,620 19.1 -7.8 +4.8
Source: California As.sn.of Realtors
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1987 . 1988
SOURCE: California Assn. of Rca/tots—5—
The height of the boom seems to have come In May 1988. Between May and
June, a single month, the California Association of Realtors reported a 10.2
percent increase in the median price of single—family homes In San Francisco
and a 4.1 percent increase in Orange County. Such rates of Increase drew
national attention. On June 1, 1988, the Hall Street Journal carried a
headline on the front page reading "Buyers' Panic Sweeps California's Big
Market in One—Family Homes." The Journal article speaks of "a buying frenzy
that extends to every segment of the market" and describes lines of 150 cars
waiting to buy houses. Articles on the real estate market appeared in the 1Q1
Angeles Times and the San Francisco Chronicle an average of more than four
times per week during the summer of 1988, carrying leads such as "The real
estate market is getting so frenzied, prospective home owners are offering
more than asking price" (Chronicle, 7/6/88). The president of the Alameda
County Board of Realtors is quoted in the same article: "The market is hotter
than a pistol .... Iwent to a presentation last night In Fremont for a
$400,000 home that had been on the market for five days. There were five
offers, and the winning bid was more than the asking price."
Boston
The Boston housing price boom began in 1983. The most rapid growth
occurred between 1984 and 1985 when growth rates neared 40 percent per year.
Multiple sales data presented In Case (1986) confirmed rapid acceleration of
prices beginning In the first quarter of 1984, peaking In the third quarter of
1985, and slowing steadily through 1986 and 1987. Housing prices doubled
between the beginning of 1984 and mid—1987.
Median price fell in Boston in both the fourth quarter of 1987 and the
first quarter of 1988. The Boston Globe reported the dip with great fanfare.—6—
On February 17, 1988 the business page carried the full—page headline
"Boston—area houses register a $3,000 price drop." It was also reportedIn
that article that "the Inventory of single—family homes offered for sale
through [the Greater Boston Real Estate Board's) multiple listingservice has
increased from 2,512 to 4,814. The average stay on the market has increased
from 58 to 80 days ....Longgone are the days when asking prices were
extremely exuberant but home buyers met themanyway."2
Milwaukee
Milwaukee was chosen for its remarkable record of price stability. The
median home price series for Boston presented In table 1 has a standard
deviation of $34,743. The same statistic for the Milwaukee series is $2,210.
Since 1983, median price has risen an average of less than 1 percent per year,
from $68,000 to $71,500.
II. The Survey
The universe, the samples and the response rates on the survey are
described in table 4. A mailing list of 3,871 persons who bought homesIn May
1988, was purchased from Dataman, Inc., a research and marketingfirm in
Atlanta. Dataman collects names, addresses and selling pricesfrom public
records of closings. The data are made available by 3—digit zip code.The
lists for Boston and Milwaukee contained addresses drawn from theentire
metropolitan areas. The California zip codes were for thecities of San
Francisco and Anaheim in Orange County.
From the universe, samples of 500 were drawn at random for Boston,Anaheim
and Milwaukee; 530 were drawn for San Francisco. The surveyfollowed methods
described by Dillman (1978). Each household In the sample was sent a 10—page*Returned unusable included numerous notes that the property had only
been refinanced, several properties were out of state, butthe owner
resided in state, three were land deals, several claimed neverto have
bought a home.











BOSTON (021) 1383500 67 12 421200 47.5%
MILWAUKEE (532) 615500 36 7 457246 53.8
ANAHEIM (928) 576500 21 12 467241 51.6










questionnaire with a personalized cover letter hand—signed by bothauthors.
The original mailing was sent on July 17 and 18. This was followed upwith a
post card reminder mailed to the entire sample on July 26.A third mailing to
those who did not respond was sent on August 16 and 17. The third mailing
contained a duplicate questionnaire (for those who had misplaced the first)
and a new personalized cover letter. As an Incentive to participate, we
offered to send survey results to those who requested them.
A total of 142 surveys (7 percent) were returned "delivery attempted ——
notknown" by the Post Office. Another 37 were returned by recipientsbut
were inappropriate for use in the survey. Among these werereplies from
several who had only refinanced their homes, some who had bought land only,
others who had actually bought property out of state and a few whoclaimed to
have not been involved in a sale at all. With these excluded, the net sample
size was 1,851.
In total, 886 responses were coded and tabulated. Response rates were
above 50 percent In Milwaukee and Anaheim, close to 50 percentin Boston and
39.3 percent in San Francisco. Such response rates are about what wewould
expect given the extensive follow up and personalized format.The
questionnaire was long and fairly detailed, taking close tohalf an hour to
complete, but the subject of the questionnaire was likely tobe of interest to
recent home buyers.
The questionnaire
We did some pre—test interviews of a small number of home buyersIn the
cities in our sample. He used some of their responses as the basefor adding
questions to the survey.—8—
The questions are worded in everyday language. In some cases the question
may seem, to an economist, to be ill—defined orto suggest fallacious
concepts. We Included such questions purposely, as a way of documentinghow
people express themselves. We will discuss the results of the surveyin
several parts. First, we will explore what the responses suggest about the
spread of high expectations for Investment potential during booms. Second, we
will describe how people seem to Interpret the booms. Third we discuss the
question of upward rigidity and excess demand. Finally we turn tothe Issue
of excess supply and downward price stickiness, focusing on seller behavior.
Table 5 presents a brief description of the respondents' purchases. In
two of the cities, Milwaukee and Anaheim, about 70 percent of the properties
were single—family homes. Boston had the lowest percentage at 39.7,whIle San
Francisco stood at 55.9. Boston had the largest proportion of condominiums
and cooperatives. What was not a single—family home, a cooperative or a condo
was either a duplex or "other." The properties listed as "other"Included
triple deckers, three— and four—family homes, apartments and town houses.In
a11 cities except San Francisco, nearly 90 percent of the properties were
bought as primary residences. A significant number in San Francisco were
purchased to rent to others.
ExDectations and Investment in the Housina Market. Without question, home
buyers in all four cities looked at their decision to buy as aninvestment
decision. Table 6 presents tabulations of three questions that shed some
light on the extent to which home buyers were motivated by Investment
considerations. In both California cities, over 95 percent said that they
thought of their purchase as an investment at least in part. In Boston,the
figure was 93.0 percent and In Milwaukee, 89.7 percent. A surprisingly large
number in San Francisco, 37.2 percent, said that they bought the property
"strictly" for investment purposes.TABLE 5
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS'
HOME PURCHASES
San
Anaheim Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Single family homes 70.0% 55.9% 39.7%71.1%
Condo or coop 22.1 20.5 43.7 11.4
First time buyer 35.8 36.2 51.5 56.9
Bought to live in as a
primary residence 88.4 72.7 92.0 88.2
Bought to rent to others3.7 12.1 3.0 4.1TABLE 6
Housing as an Investment
(Percent of responses in each category)
Questions:
"In decidin9 to buy your property,
did you think of the purchase as an
investment?"







"Why did you buy the hone that you did?" (N=238) (N=199)

















"Buying a home in today involves:" (N=237)(N=192)(N=l97)(N=237)
"A great dealofrisk" 3.4 4.2 5.1 5.9
"Some risk" 33.3 40.1 57.9 64.6
"Little ornorisk" 63.3 55.7 37.1 29.5—9—
Clearly, one's wiflingness to pay for an asset dependsin part on the
perceived degree of risk associated with it. Very fewhome buyers in any of
the four cities thought that the housing market involved a greatdeal of
risk. Even in Boston, where newspapers have been openly speculatingabout the
possibility of a crash, 37.1 percent said that buying a homeinvolves little
or no risk. The degree of risk perceived is clearlylowest in the boom
markets. Rising prices seem to dampen fears, and that may well fuelthe
boom. In Anaheim a full 63.3 percent said that their purchase was essentially
ri sk—free.
It is important to keep in mind from the outset that the sampleis a
sample of actual home buyers. That is, the people who were surveyedwere the
ones who went out and bought homes in May. It canbe assumed that they would
have significantly higher expectations than the general populationof
Dotential home buyers. In addition, they are likely to have alower
perception of risk than the general population of potential buyers.We did
not sample, and indeed could not have sampled, those whodecided not to buy
because they were worried about future losses and risks.
Table 7 presents responses to a number of questions designed to probethe
actual price expectations of buyers. First, virtually every buyerIn our
California cities and the vast majority of buyers in Bostonand Milwaukee
believe that prices will rise. As you would expect, thosein the boom cities
are more optimistic than those in Boston andMilwaukee. Of 440 respondents
from California, only two said prices were falling andfive thought prices
were not changing.
When asked how much they thought that their propertywould appreciate over
the next 12 months and over the next 10 years, the respondents'answers were
enormously varied. There were significant modes at 5,10 and 15 percent inBoom Markets:
San Questions: Anaheim Francisco
"Do you think that housing prices in the
area will increase or decrease
over the next several years?
"Increase"
'I
"Howmuch of a change do you expect
there to be in the value of your home
over the next 12 months?" (percent)
"Which of the following best describes
the trend in home prices in the















"It's a good time to buy because













98.3 99.0 90.2 87.1







"On averageover the next ten years, how (N=208)
much do you expect the value of your






8.8 12.8 34.3 53.0
0.4 3.1 37.4 23.9











"Housing prices are booming. Unless I




"There has been a good deal of excitement
surrounding recent housing price
changes. I sometimes think that
I may have been influenced by it:
"In conversations with friends and
associates over the last few months,























9.7 12.125.1 8.0 4.7—10—
all four cities for both questions. In California, there were significant
modes at 10, 15 and 20 percent. The average expected annual increase for
buyers in California was in the 15 percent range, while for Milwaukeeand
Boston, the figures were roughly half as high.
Three questions probed whether expected price increases actually
influenced the decisions to buy. The answer seems to be an overwhelming
"yes." Even in Boston, 77.8 percent reported that it was a good timeto buy
because prices were likely to rise in the future. For Milwaukee the figure
was 84.8 percent, while it was well over 90 percent In both California
cities. At least one—quarter of the buyers In all markets and at least
two—thirds of the California buyers expressed a fear of being unable to afford
to buy a home in the future. Over half of the buyers in the boom cities
worried that they might have been influenced by the excitement surrounding
recent housing price movements.
Finally, the enthusiasm expressed In the boom cities seems to have a
social basis. There is significantly more discussion among friends and
associates in the California markets surveyed.
Interpretations of Booms. A number of specific questions were designed to
probe people's interpretations of price movements and possible triggersthat
changed their opinions. It is critical to distinguish between mob psychology,
excessive optimism and a situation in which a solid reason to expect price
increases exists. Since most people expressed a strong Investment motive, one
would assume significant knowledge of underlying market fundamentals. The
efficient markets hypothesis assumes that asset buyers make rational decisions
based on all available information and based on a consistent model of
underlying market forces.—11—
The survey reveals little real knowledge of or agreement about the
underlying causes of price movements. Rather than citing any concrete
evidence, people retreat into cliches and images. Table 8 presents a
tabulation of two Important open—ended questions. Respondents were asked to
explain recent price changes and also to report on any specific events that
changed the trend In prices. Nearly all respondents read these questions to
be asking for the same Information, so we tabulated them together.
In all four cities, interest rate changes are cited as a major factor.
First of all, interest rates are virtually Identical everywhere, and housing
prices have been relatively stable In the regions between the coasts. Second,
while there has been some recent movement upwards In interest rates,
forecasters are hardly unanimous in their predictions about future movements.
Finally, housing price movements In Boston and Milwaukee have been
dramatically different from price movements In California. It is hard to
understand how price changes in all four cities can be driven by Interest
rates.
Second in overall frequency were general comments about the local economy,
such as "strong local economy" or "growing regional economy." None of these
references cited any specific evidence of such strength or any detail about
Its character. It may be that further probing was needed to expose more
specifics, but since there was plenty of space to write on the questionnaire
we must take the responses at face value.
The responses to questions in this section leave the strong impression
that people look to observed price movements to form their expectations and
then look around for a logic to explain and reinforce their beliefs: "It's a
nice place to live;" "Asians are buying up our land;" "The economy is
strong." Irrelevant stories that make a vivid Impression tend to be cited:
"There is just too much traffic around here."TABLE 8
Popular Themes Mentioned in Interpreting Recent Price Changes
"What do you think explains recent changes in home prices
in _____?Whatultimately is behind what's going on?
"Was there any event or events in the last two years that
you think changed the trend in home prices?"
(Figures are percent of total Post
tabulated questionaireS by!2Markets: Boom: Control:
city) San
Anaheim Francisco Boston Milwaukee
References to fundamentals:
National:
Interest rate changes 31.7 39.5 24.5 27.0
Stock market crash 1.7 2.1 25.0 2.0
Demographics —babyboom 1.3 5.1 4.0 1.2
Tax law changes 1.3 4.1 3.0 2.0
Other national economic changes 1.7 5.1 8.5 2.9
Regional:
Region is a good place to live 16.7 17.9 6.0 2.4
Immigration or population change 20.4 8.2 11.0 2.4
Asian investors 2.9 27.2 0 0
Asian immigrants 2.1 13.8 .5 0
Income growth 2.5 1.5 2.0 1.2
Anti—growth legislation 10.8 3.1 0 0
Not enough land 7.5 18.5 2.0 0.4
Local Taxes 2.9 0 4.0 9.8
Increasing Black population 0.4 0 0 6.6
Rental Rates and Vacancies .8 2.6 6.5 2.0
Traffic congestion 3.8 7.2 0 0
Local economy —general 25.4 4.6 29.5 18.4
Psychology of the Housing Market (a) 5.4 7.1 18.0 0.8
Quantitative evidence (b) 0 0 0 0
No answer 15.8 17.9 20.0 18.4
Notes to Table 8: To tabulate this open ended 9uestiOfl,60 questionaires
from each of two cities, Anaheim and San Francisco, wereindependently coded
by two coders. In addition, 60 questionaireSfrom the Boston sample were
coded by three coders. Intercoder reliability wastested by calculating the
simple correlation coefficient between the rawnumber of responses in each
category across coders. The correlation forAnaheim was .986 and for San
Francisco .969. For Boston, three coefficients could becalculated: .953,
.976 and .985. For cities used in the reliability test,the final score in
each catecory is the simple average across coders. Theremaining
questionaires were coded by just one coder.Notes to Table 8 Continued.
(a) Any reference to panic, frenzy, greed, apathy, foolishness, excessive
optimism, excessive pessimism or other such factors were coded in this
category.
(b) Coders were asked to look for any reference at all to any numbers
relevant to future supply or demand for housing or to any professional
forecast of supply or demand. The numbers need not be presented as
long as the respondent seems to be referring to such numbers.—12—
Among the most popular cliches were "The region Is a good place tolive"
and "there is not enough land." Neither of these Is news and neither could
explain a sudden boom. We also asked exDlicitlv whether the boom was dueto
the area's being a desirable place to live, and whether the real problem was
that there was not enough land available (table 9). (We asked these questions
because we had observed In pretesting telephone interviews that people in boom
cities tended to say this.) Respondents In boom cities very largely answered
"yes" to these questions. We were careful to ask the open—ended questionsat
the beginning of the questionnaire and the explicit ones at the end to ensure
that we did not suggest answers. It should be noted, moreover, thatit is one
of the strengths of our method that the same questionnaire wasdistributed in
the different cities. Very few people mentioned these cliches In Milwaukee.
Most participants in housing markets do not attribute market events to the
psychology of other investors. We see from table 8 that "psychologyof the
market" was mentioned by housing market participants in fewer than 10 percent
of the responses, except for Boston where the figure was 18 percent.We also
asked explicitly whether respondents preferred to describe their own theory
about recent trends as one about psychology or one about economicfundamentals
(table 9). In all four cities fewer than a quarter picked psychology.This
is also consistent with evidence in Pound and Shiller (1987) about
institutional investors In corporate stocks, most of whom thought that prices
were driven by fundamentals, even in a stock whose pricehad boomed and had
high price—earnings ratios. However, a similar question was putto investors
right after the stock market crash of October 1987,and the answers were quite
different. About two—thirds of both individual and Institutionalinvestors In
the United States thought the crash was due to market psychology(Shiller
1987), while three—quarters of iapanese institutionalinvestors thought theTABLE 9
Buyers' Interpretation of Recent Events
(Percent of respondents in each category)
Post
Boom Markets: Boom: Control:
Questions: San
Anaheim Francisco Boston Milwaukee
"In a hot real estate market, sellers
often 9et more than one offer on the day
they list their property. Some are even
over asking price. There are also
stories about people waiting in line to
make offers. Which is the best (N2l0) (N=177)(N=176)(N=211)
explanation?"
"There is panic buying, and price
becomes irrelevant." 73.3 71.2 61.4 34.6
"Asking prices have adjusted slowly
or sluggishly to increasing demand." 26.7 28.8 38.6 65.4
"Housing prices have boomed in
because lots of people want toTIVe (N2l0) (N=178)(N=181)(N=l93)
here."
"Agree" 98.6 93.3 69.6 16.1
"Disagree" 1.4 6.7 30.4 83.9
"The real problem in _____isthat
there is just not enough land (Nl97) (N=l74) (N=168)(N=l92)
available."
"Agree" 52.8 83.9 54.2 17.2
"Disagree" 47.2 16.1 45.8 82.8
"When there is simply not enough
housing available, price becomes (N=197)(N=l65)(N=17l)(N=l93)
unimportant."
"A9ree" 34.0 40.6 26.9 20.7
"Disagree" 66.0 59.4 73.1 79.3Table 9 Continued Post




"which of the following better
describes your theory about recent (N=226) (Nl80) (N188) (N=215)
trends in home prices in _."
"Itis a theory about the
psychology of home buyers
and sellers." 11.9 16.7 21.3 10.7
"It is a theory about economic or
demographic conditions, such as
population changes, changes in
interest rates or emplOyment." 88.1 83.3 78.7 89.3—13-.
crash was due to market psychology (Shfller, Konya and Tsutsui 1988). Perhaps
popular boom theories emphasize fundamentals as causes of upward price
movements (despite the fact that irrational behavior is thought to be
present), while sudden crashes are thought to be due to panic.
An especially striking feature of the coded answers In table 8 Is that not
a single respondent referred to explicit quantitative evidence relevant to
future supply of or demand for housing. We did not ask explicitly for such
evidence, but among 886 responses one would expect some to volunteer such
evidence if it figured prominently in their views.
Excess Demand and Upward Rigidity in Asking Prices. In boom cities,
newspaper accounts feature stories of homes that sold well above the asking
price, interpreting this phenomenon as evidence of investor frenzy or panic.
Recall the examples of such newspaper accounts from our discussion of the
current boom In California. The view that excess demand Is evidence of
Investor panic is also very popular among market participants in the boom
cities, as the last question in table 9 indicates. It Is likely that the
local media had some success in spreading the notion that prices above asking
prices are evidence of panic, since this view was much more common in the boom
cities than in the control city.
The news media seem to exaggerate the importance of such sales above
asking price. In fact, houses selling above the asking price were reported in
all our cities (table 10), so the fact that a newspaper reporter can find
examples is not much evidence of a boom market. The incidence of such sales
was significantly higher In the boom cities as in our control city, but was
still only about 6 to 10 percent. The prevalence of such examples Is better
at discriminating between boom and post—boom cities; fewer than 1 percent of
houses In our sample sold above the asking price In Boston.TABLE 10
Upward Rigidity in Asking Prices
(Percent of responses in each category)
Post
Boom Markets: Boom: Control:
Questions:
San
Anahe Francisco Boston Milwaukee
"Did you finally settle on a price
that was:"
"above the asking price?"
"equal to the asking price?"
"below the asking price?"
"If you had asked 5 to io percent more
for your property, what would the
likely outcome have been?"
"It wouldn't have sold"
"It would have sold, but it would
have taken much more time"
"If buyers had to pay that much, they
might not be able to obtain financing
(a buyer cannot obtain financing
unless an appraiser confirms the
worth of the property)"
"it probably would have sold almost
as quickly"
"Other"
6.3 9.8 0.5 3.3
38.0 26.8 23.5 22.7
(N=89)(N=64) (N=61) (N=43)
21.3 23.4 31.1 32.5
44.9 46.9 54.1 37.2
7.9 9.4 0.0 9.3
24.7 17.2 11.5 16.3
1.1 3.1 3.3 4.7TABLE 10 continued
Post
Boom Markets: Boom: Control:
Questions: San
Anaheim Francisco Boston Milwaukee
"If you answered that it would have sold
almost as quickly, which of the following
explains why you didn't set the price
higher (you can check more than one)" (N=37)(N=22) (N=26) (N=l6)
"The property simply wasn't worth
that much" 32.4 27.3 38.5 25.0
"It wouldn't have been fair to set it
that high; given what I paid for it
I was already getting enough." 16.2 22.7 15.4 31.3
"I simply made a mistake or got bad
advise; I should have asked more" 21.6 18.2 19.2 25.0
"Other" 29.7 31.8 26.9 18.8
"In the six months prior to the time
you first listed your property, did
you receive any unsolicited calls from
a real estate agent or anyone else (N=89) (N=6l) (N=62) (N=48)
about the possibility of selling your
house?"
"yes" 71.9 59.0 38.7 52.1
"No" 28.1 41.0 61.3 47.9
"Approximate Number" 8.7 5.0 3.9 2.7
(l0.9)* (2.6)* (3.l)* (l.6)*
*StandardDeviations-14—
Ne also sought evidence why some sellers did not raisetheir asking price
more (table 10). Those who thought they mighthave asked more often agreed
that notions of intrinsic worth or fairness played a rolein their decision.
Real estate agents in the boom cities told us that, becauseof the excess
demand situation, they found It profitable to spend more time soliciting
listings, rather than showing houses to potential buyers.The responses to
the last question in table 10 largely confirm that real estate agentswere
behaving as this would suggest.
Excess SUDD1V and ppwnward Rigidity In Asking Prices.A third important
aspect of behavior in housing markets Is sellerbehavior In post—boom markets
or generally soft markets. There is a gooddeal of worry that these booms
will end, as most stock market booms end, in collapse. If,indeed, what we
are observing in Orange County and SanFrancisco can appropriately be called
"bubbles," won't they inevitably burst?
One theory holds that housing prices are downwardly rigid,and that this
rigidity is likely to prevent major real estate collapsesIn the absence of a
general economic collapse. Significant reasonsexist to predict such
rigidity. First, the housing market is verydifferent from the stock market.
In the stock market, people can exit their equity positionsquickly and almost
without cost. The analog of a Treasury Bill in the housingmarket Is moving
to a rental unit. For those with considerable equitythis would mean paying
large capital gains taxes and a 6 percent brokeragefee, as well as putting up
with the aggravation of a move. Thus, the transactionscosts are very large.
Second, investors have an alleged psychologicaldisposition to sell their
winning investments (to have the satisfactionof getting their money), and to
hold on to losing investments (to avoid the painof regret; see Shefrln and
Statrnan 1985). Ferris, Haugen and Hakhija 1988have found evidence for this—15—
"disposition effect" by documentation that the volume of trade in stock whose
value has declined is lower than in stocks that have increased in value.
In addition, the popular impression is that past experience has shown that
waiting may pay off, perhaps the best example being California in 1981. After
four years of boom, housing prices stopped rising. While it is clear that
some people lost money in the real estate market, many simplydecided to wait
It out; the number of transactions dropped to very low levels, and median
price never fell in nominal terms. Since 1983, prices have again been onthe
rise.
Table 11 presents evidence on seller behavior in markets with excesss
supply. All respondents were asked to react to the first statement ontable
U. Nearly 70 percent of respondents in California agreed with the statement
that the best strategy in a slow market is to hold on until you get what you
want. In Boston and Milwaukee more than half agree.
The remaining questions were asked of those who had sold or tried to sell
a property immediately prior to buying the one that they bought.This
relatively small sample is likely to be a biased sample of all sellers.
Recall that these sellers are the ones who actually bought new homes. If a
seller was unable to sell her house, did not lower her price, and ultimately
decided not to buy a new house, she Is not In our sample. Thus, those who
were at least somewhat flexible are likely to be over—represented.
Buyers who had sold or tried to sell a home prior to buying their present
unit were 39.6 percent of the total respondents in AnaheIm, 32.6 percent in
San Francisco, 32.8 percent In Boston, and 21.3 percent In Milwaukee. Since
the vast majority of this group (over 90 percent in all cities except
Milwaukee where the figure was 84.3 percent) had actually sold their
properties, the only way to probe the issue was with a hypothetical question.TABLE 11
Excess Supply and Downward Rigidityin Asking Prices
(Percent of responses in each category)
Post
Boom Markets: Boom: Control:
Questions:
San
Anaheim Franc22 Boston Milwaukee
"Since housing prices are unlikely to
drop very much, the best strategyin
a slow market is to hold onuntil you (N=174)(N=l48)(N=160)(N=l80)
get what you want for a property"
"Agree"
69.0 69.6 57.5 50.6
"Disagree"
31.0 30.4 42.5 49.4
"If you had not been able to sell your
property for the price that you (N=88) (N=62)(N=6l) (N=43)
received, what would you have done?"
"Left the price the same and waited
for a buyer knowing full well that42.0 38.7 32.8 32.6
it might take a long time."
"Lowered the price step by step
hoping to find a buyer." 20.5 38.7 42.6 20.9
"Lowered the price till I found a
buyer."
4.5 3.2 4.9 7.0
"Taken the house off the market." 18.2 17.7 11.5 27.9
"Other" (a)
14.8 1.6 8.2 11.6
"If you responded that you woulhave
lowered your price, is there a limit
to how far you would have goneif the (N=33) (N=38)(N=29) (N=l6)
property still hadn't sold?"
"Yes" 81.8 78.9 93.1 87.5Table 11 Continued
Post
Boom Markets: Boom: Control:
Questions: San
Anaheim Francisco Boston Milwaukee
"Ifyouanswered yes to the above
question, can you say how you arrived(N24) (N=28)(N=21) (N=l0)
at that limit" (Open ended)
Based on what I paid 29.2 21.4 19.0 30.0
Based on price of another home
that I want to buy 33.3 35.7 38.1 20.0
Based on what other similar homes
have sold for 37.5 42.9 42.9 50.0
"If your property did not sell,
presumably it would have if you had
lowered your asking price more. If
you considered doing so but decided (N=19)(N=18) (Nl3) (N=13)
riot to can you say why?"
"My house is worth more than
people seem to be willing to 15.8 11.1 7.7 38.5
pay right now."
"I can't afford to sell at a
lower price" 26.3 33.3 23.1 15.4
"By holding out, I will be able
to get more later." 31.6 44.4 15.4 7.6
"Other." (b) 26.3 11.1 53.9 38.5
(a) The most frequently mentioned "other" categories were company buy out
provisions and that sellers would rent the property out.
(b) Many of the "other" responses made reference to time, i.e., "I wasin
no hurry," "I was not anxious about selling" or "I had no need to sell."—16—
We asked, "If you had not been able to sell your property for the pricethat
you received, what would you havedone?" Only a very small fraction said that
they would lower their price until they found a buyer ——themarket—clearing
solution.
A significant percentage (between 20 and 40 percent) In each citysaid
that they would lower the price step by step, looking for a buyer.However,
when probed further, more than three quarters in all cities reportedthat
there was a limit to how far they would drop the price: Surprisinglythe
figures were highest in Boston and Milwaukee, 93.1 percentand 87.5 percent
respectively. Most of them seemed to have some knowledgeof what comparable
homes had sold for, and they did not want to sell for less.
The "other" category in the second question reportedin table 10 reveals
two additional sources of downward rigidity. Several respondentsmentioned
that their employer had a buy—out program for employeeswho could not sell.
What they really meant was a buy—out plan for employees whocould not sell at
the price that they wanted to get. A number of others reportedsimply renting
out their first property.
Finally, the small group of sellers who had not soldtheir properties were
asked why they did not simply drop their price. Some of the samenotions of
fairness or Intrinsic worth that played a role in the upward rigiditystudied
above appear to play a role here. Others said they couldnot afford to sell,
and still others expressed optimism that they could sellat a higher price
eventually.
IV. Interpretations and Conjectures
What have we learned about sources of the booms thatfrom time to time
appear in local housing markets?Evidence in this paper supports the view—17—
that the suddenness of booms has to be understood in terms of investor
reactions to one another, to past price increases, or to other evidence of
boom markets, rather than to economic fundamentals. Of course, we did not
look at data on fundamentals in this paper, and the paper that one of us did
on the Impact of fundamentals on city housing prices (Case 1986) is certainly
not the last word on the subject. But we have in this paper provided some
evidence that investors in housing markets do not know fundamentals. They
tend to interpret events in terms of hearsay, cliches, and casual
observations. Moreover, we have seen that investment motivations are high on
their list of incentives, and that home buyers in booms expect still more
appreciation of housing prices and are worried about being priced out of the
housing market in the future. It is certainly plausible that expectations
heavily influence the prices people are willing to pay in these markets.
Because these expectations do not appear to make much sense except as
extrapolations of past price changes, we cannot expect prices to be rationally
determined.
But what starts a housing boom; why does It occur in one year and not
another? We asked home buyers what they thought was going on, and whether
they could name an event that they thought changed the behavior of housing
prices. The most popular answer In all cities was a change in interest rates,
but interest rates do not differ much across cities and so cannot be the
explanation of the differing price behavior. Moreover, Interest rates were
cited as the cause of the boom in California and as the cause of stagnation in
Boston. For the most part, respondents did not produce another event. The
most plausible—sounding event In Anaheim (proposed anti—growth legislation)
was quite different from the most plausible—sounding event in San Francisco
(the entrance of Asian investors into the market), and yet the pattern of—18—
price changes was similar in the two cities.The events may instead be
after—the—fact rationalizations of the price movements, just asthe October
1987 stock market crash was brought up mainly in Boston,where an explanation
of a slump was needed.
The trigger Is apparently an event or sequence of eventsnot observed by
most home buyers. Since the ultimate trigger is notthe factor In the minds
of investors, it could even be something that was notobserved by .ay
Investors, except through price. For example, demographicchange or income
growth could cause an initial price Increase,to which home buyers reacted.
Perhaps home buyers in California in 1987and 1988 were also more primed to
react to a price Increase, having heard stories ofthe boom in the Northeast.
Another puzzle concerns the slowness of the booms: Whydo booms extend
over years, and not accelerate and terminate veryquickly? Our survey results
offer only marginal help In conjectures regardingthis question. The notion
expressed by some investors that they weremotivated by a sense of intrinsic
worth and comparisons with past prices may suggestthat there is a
psychological resistance to very rapid priceincreases. It is of course true
that there are barriers to professsionai speculatorsentering and closing off
profit opportunities in the market for single—familyhomes; that Is why we
were not surprised to find persistencein price changes in our earlier study
of the efficiency of housing prices (Case andShiner 1989). Ordinary
Individuals, who are not Investment professionals,should be expected to take
more time before investing. Such action mayinvolve a change in living
arrangements and may well take months or years.
Respondents were somewhat Inconsistentin their reporting of their
impression that psychological factors wereresponsible for the booms. We saw
that about half of respondents in boomcities thought they themselves were—19—
influenced by the excitement, and that most interpreted houses selling above
asking prices as evidence of panic. Yet other evidence in tables 8 and 9
indicates that most investors do not think that market psychology is the best
explanation for booms, citing fundamentals instead. Perhaps we should
conclude that social psychology is an important factor in the transmission of
booms, but that individuals' perceptions of the psychology of others are less
so.
The proportion of homes that sell above the asking price Is quite low in
all cities. Apparently newspapers feature such stories in boom cities because
they are perceived as relevant to the big story of area—wide price increases.
In a city not experiencing such price increases, such occurrences are more
likely to be interpreted as evidence of simple errors In setting the asking
price, and are not thought to be particularly newsworthy.
If such occurrences reflect mistakes by a small minority of sellers in
setting the asking price, then it is to be expected that such errors will
occur more frequently in cities that are currently experiencing Increases if
some sellers are slow to adjust their price. Perhaps occurrences of sales
price above asking price ought to be Interpreted as nothing more than that.
On the other hand, some of the answers reported in table 10 suggest that
notions of a fair price or of intrinsic worth may also play a role in the
sluggishness of price changes. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1987) have
documented the Importance of notions of fairness In many economic decisions.
The same notions of fairness arise also in answers to questions as to why
those who had trouble selling houses did not cut their prices more.
Evidence of price rigidity appeared to be more significant In falling
markets than in rising markets. Only about 5 percent of the respondents in
the post—boom city Boston who had not sold their former property said they—20—
would continue to lower the price until a buyer was found. One possible
explanation of the downward rigidity in housing prices comesfrom the prospect
theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In their theory,losses and gains are
viewed very differently, and the point from which individuals measurewhether
they have made a gain or loss may be determined bythe frame of reference that
attracts their attention.3
The Regret theories of Bell (1982) and Loomis and Sugden (1982) have
similar implications. However, as we saw above, other Interpretationsof the
rigidity are possible. Popular impressions as to the likely courseof future
prices are also at work here. The fact that a high a proportionof home
buyers in all cities thought there was littlerisk in the housing market
reflects a popular view that one cannot lose in this market; houses are always
a safe investment, so long as one holds out long enough.
Another reason chosen by those who could not sell was that "I can'tafford
to sell at a lower price." Since all of the respondent sellershad
subsequently bought another house, it is likely that an importantfactor in
this judgment was the price of the other house they bought.If all real
estate prices are too high, one may find it difficult to cutthe asking price
on one's own house, since one cannot coordinatethis price cut with the seller
of the house one wishes to purchase. Part of the problemin downward rigidity
of housing prices may then be a coordination problemof the kind that economic
theorists have stressed in othercontexts.4 If we could all agree at once
to cut the prices of our houses, we might all be happy,but I can't be the
first one to cut.
All these reasons for downward rigidity in prices may beinterrelated. If
the coordination problem prevents prices from falling,this creates an
impression that they should not fall and therefore animpression that it pays—21—
us to hold out; this impression heightens the regret experienced If one cuts
price.
Conclusions
All of this suggests a market for residential real estate that Is very
different from the one traditionally discussed and modeled In the literature.
In a fully rational market1 prices would be driven by fundamentals such as
income, demographic changes, national economic conditions and so forth.
Investors In such a market would use all available Information on potential
changes in fundamentals to forecast future price movements, making prolonged
prIce swings impossible and profit opportunities rare. Resources including
access to popular regions would be efficiently allocated.
The survey results presented here and actual price behavior together
sketch a very different picture. While the evidence is circumstantial, and we
can only offer conjectures, we see a market driven largely by expectations.
People seem to form their expectations on the basis of past price movements
rather than any knowledge of fundamentals. This increases the likelihood that
price booms will persist as home buyers In essence become destabilizing
speculators.
He also found significant evidence that in the absence of a severe
economic decline, housing prices are inflexible downward. Combined with
upward volatility, this inflexibility has produced a ratcheting effect in some
boom cities with complicated distributional consequences, as owners gain at
the expense of non—owners at all levels of income.
At this point we are not prepared to offer or even speculate about
possible policy conclusions. We only hope that further research will help
shed more light on this still puzzling market.Footnotes
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1See Drexier, Schwartz, and Grelner (1988).
2The Boston Glob, February 17, 1988, p. Bl.
3Kahneman and Tversky write that "This analysis suggeststhat a person
who has not made peace with his losses is likelyto accept gambles that would
be unacceptable to him otherwise" (1979, p. 287).
4For example, Keynes's theory of the downward rigidityin wages in a
depression was that "since there is, as a rule,no means of securing a
simultaneous and equal reduction of money—wagesIn all Industries, It Is in
the interest of all workers to resist areduction in their own particular
case" (1936, p. 264).References
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